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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Appellee Strawberry Water Users Association ("Strawberry") 
agrees with the statement of jurisdiction contained in Appellant 
Water Power Company's ("Water Power") principal brief. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-505(1): 
Intent: 
To establish uniform criteria and a uniform format for 
affidavits in support of attorneys' fees. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall govern the award of attorneys' fees in 
the trial courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) Affidavits in support of an award of attorneys' 
fees must be filed with the court and set forth specifically 
the legal basis for the award, the nature of the work 
performed by the attorney, the number of hours spent to 
prosecute the claim to judgment, or the time spent in 
pursuing the matter to the stage for which attorneys' fees 
are claimed, and affirm the reasonableness of the fees for 
comparable legal services. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Water Power appeals the trial court's denial of attorney 
fees for the civil and administrative proceedings below and asks 
for attorney fees expended on appeal. (Appellant's Brief at 1). 
However, Water Power misconstrues the appropriate standard of 
review for this issue. 
This Court will affirm a trial court's denial of attorney 
fees absent an abuse of discretion. Baldwin v. Burton, 850 P.2d 
1188, 1198 (Utah 1993); Equitable Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 
1187, 1194 (Utah App. 1993), cert. den. 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993). 
The proper standard is not, as Water Power contends, the 
"correctness" standard used for reviewing summary judgments. 
Water Power is not appealing the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment against the causes of action in its Complaint, but the 
denial of its incidental request for attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and 
Disposition in Court Below. 
Water Power filed a Complaint against Strawberry in 1990 
seeking damages for breach of contract, anticipatory breach of 
contract, and declaratory relief. (R. 24-33). The trial court 
granted Strawberry's Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground 
that the causes of action raised in Water Power's Complaint were 
moot. The Court also denied plaintiff's belated and unsupported 
request for an award of attorney fees. (R. 268-9; 290) (Ruling 
on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Order on Summary 
Judgment attached as Addendum A). 
B. Statement of Facts.1 
The parties entered an agreement in 19 83 calling for Water 
Power to provide certain products and services in connection with 
the construction of a hydroelectric powerhouse for Strawberry. 
*Water Power does not cite to the record in its "Statement 
of the Case," as required by Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 
24(a)(7). Since there is no support for the statements contained 
therein, Strawberry asks this Court at a minimum to disregard 
Water Power's "Statement of the Case." Additionally, this Court 
may disregard the issues presented on appeal for lack of 
evidentiary basis and assume the correctness of the judgment 
below as in English v. Standard Optical Co., 814 P.2d 613, 618-9 
(Utah App. 1991). 
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(R. 31) (contract attached as Addendum B). Although both parties 
assumed that the transaction was exempt from state sales, excise 
or use tax, the agreement stated in boilerplate terms appended to 
the contract that Strawberry Water would be responsible for the 
payment of taxes. (R. 161). 
1. AFTER ELECTING TO PURSUE ITS OWN TAX APPEAL, WATER 
POWER CLAIMED STRAWBERRY WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE 
INTEREST AND COSTS ACCRUED AFTER STRAWBERRY'S 
APPEAL HAD BEEN RESOLVED. 
In March 1987 the Utah State Tax Commission served Water 
Power with a preliminary notice assessing Water Power for sales 
made in connection with the agreement. (R. 29-30). A similar 
notice was served on Strawberry for sales and use taxes due under 
the same transaction. (R. 65). 
Both parties opposed the tax assessments. (R. 130). They 
initially agreed, upon Strawberry's suggestion, to consolidate 
their petitions before the Tax Commission and divide legal fees. 
(R. 130, 193). However, in August 1987, Water Power altered that 
agreement by voluntarily choosing to pursue its appeal on its 
own. (R. 130; 160). Strawberry's tax appeal was resolved in 
March 199 0 when the Tax Commission affirmed the assessment. 
(R. 2, 29). 
On December 21, 1990, many months after Strawberry's 
administrative appeal was resolved and while Water Power's 
administrative appeal was pending, Water Power filed a Complaint 
against Strawberry in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah. 
(R. 33). The Complaint alleged breach of contract and 
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anticipatory breach of contract and sought as damages only the 
amount of taxes plus interest assessed by the Tax Commission, or 
$184,970.76. (R. 25-7). The Complaint also sought costs 
incurred in pursuing the Tax Commission appeal but did not 
include any request for attorney fees. (R. 25-7). On July 2, 
1991, Strawberry sent Water Power a settlement offer of 
$132,148.87, representing the principal amount of tax owing and 
the majority of the penalty. (R. 187, 189). Water Power never 
responded to the offer in any fashion. (R. 201). 
In September 1992, over two years after Strawberry obtained 
resolution of its appeal, Water Power's appeal was resolved, 
wherein the Tax Commission affirmed the tax. (R. 124-6). The 
Tax Commission noted that Water Power had not raised any issues 
substantially different from those raised by Strawberry in its 
appeal. (R. 125) . 
2. THE TRIAL COURT EXERCISED ITS BROAD DISCRETION IN 
DENYING WATER POWER'S VAGUE REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY 
FEES. 
On January 13, 1994, Water Power moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that Strawberry should pay the tax liability 
assessed against the parties. (R. 182). Water Power also 
mentioned without explanation that it was seeking attorney fees 
"as provided in the contract." (R. 176). Based upon a Rule 
56(f) affidavit submitted by Strawberry, the court granted a 
sixty-day continuance and directed Strawberry's counsel to 
determine what it would take to satisfy the state for the taxes 
due. (R. 254, 261) . 
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Strawberry's counsel then contacted the Tax Commission and 
learned that the state would accept $120,135.00, the principal 
amount of the tax, in full satisfaction of the assessment. 
(R. 259, 261). 
Shortly thereafter, Strawberry satisfied the tax warrant by 
paying the Tax Commission $120,135.00, less than the amount it 
offered to Water Power several years earlier. (R. 268, 282-3). 
With this satisfaction both Water Power and Strawberry were 
released from further liability for the tax. (R. 265). 
Strawberry then submitted a motion for summary judgment on the 
basis that Water Power's claims against it were extinguished by 
the satisfaction of the tax warrant. (R. 269). Water Power 
opposed the motion, declaring without explanation or support 
therefor that it was entitled to attorney fees for the tax appeal 
and the civil lawsuit. (R. 271-2). The trial court granted 
Strawberry's Motion for Summary Judgment and found an award of 
attorneys fees unwarranted given the circumstances in the case. 
In doing so, the court acted well within its discretion. 
(R. 287). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: Water Power cannot be awarded attorney fees based 
solely upon the contract provision. Not only did Water Power 
fail to preserve this issue below, but the provision only applies 
to prevailing parties in breach of contract actions. 
Additionally, Water Power failed to demonstrate to the trial 
court that the fees it requests are reasonable as required by the 
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contract provision and by Utah law. Any attorney fees expended 
by Water Power resulted from its refusal to join Strawberry in 
appealing the tax assessments and in rejecting Strawberry's 
settlement offer--an offer which was sufficient to satisfy the 
Tax Commission. 
POINT II; Water Power also cannot be awarded attorney fees based 
on the third party tort rule. Water Power did not raise this 
issue below, and in any event the theory can only be used if 
attorney fees incurred were proximately caused by the tortious 
acts of another person, which did not occur in this case. 
POINT III: Water Power cannot be awarded attorney fees on appeal 
because it was not awarded attorney fees below. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
WATER POWER IS NOT 
ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES 
UNDER THE CONTRACT PROVISION. 
Water Power is not entitled to attorney fees incurred in the 
administrative and civil proceedings below based on an 
inapplicable contract provision that it cites for the first time 
on appeal. Neither can it demand attorney fees when it did not 
request an award of attorney fees in its Complaint and when it 
has made no showing that the fees requested are reasonable as 
required by the contract and Utah law. 
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A. Water Power Cannot Rely On The Contractual Provision 
Because It Is Not A Prevailing Party, 
On appeal, Water Power bases its claim for attorney fees on 
the following language in the contract between the parties:2 
In the event of a breach of this Agreement, the prevailing 
party shall be entitled to recover reasonable Attorney's 
fees. 
Thus, this provision only applies to benefit the party that 
prevails in a breach of contract action. While Water Power 
brought a breach of contract claim against Strawberry, this claim 
did not prevail. The lower court granted Strawberry's motion for 
summary judgment against all claims, including the breach of 
contract claim. Enforcing the contract according to its terms, 
Water Power is ineligible for attorney fees since the court never 
determined that Strawberry breached the contract. See Stacey 
Properties v. Wixen, 766 P.2d 1080, 1084-5 (Utah App. 1988) 
(plaintiff who did not prevail on complaint for acceleration not 
entitled to attorney fees under provision awarding them for 
enforcement of contract); Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 
985, 988 (Utah 1988) (attorney fees provided for in contract 
allowed only in accordance with contractual terms). 
Water Power has failed to point out how it might be 
considered the prevailing party when summary judgment was granted 
against it. The court never ruled that Strawberry breached the 
contract. In Fashion Place Associates v. Glad Rags, 754 P.2d 
940, 942 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court noted that in order to be 
2No such allegation or claim is raised in the Complaint. 
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considered a "successful party" entitled to attorney fees under a 
contract, the party must prevail both on legal theory and 
damages. Water Power prevailed on neither. The court granted 
summary judgment against its breach of contract claim, and it 
could not show that it suffered damage because Strawberry paid 
the tax assessment against them. Water Power is not 
contractually entitled to attorney fees because the provision 
only applies to prevailing parties. 
B. The Fees Requested By Water Power Are Not Reasonable As 
Required By The Contract And By Utah Law. 
1. WATER POWER ITSELF HAS NEVER SUGGESTED THAT THE 
AMOUNT IT REQUESTS IS REASONABLE. 
Water Power made a blanket demand for attorneys fees without 
any explanation or documentation whatsoever of that amount. It 
never submitted an itemization. It never filed an affidavit from 
counsel. It never explained the nature of the legal services 
performed. 
Besides restricting attorney fees to only the prevailing 
party in a breach of contract action, the contract provision 
mandates that attorney fees be reasonable. This requirement 
parallels the common-law rule that even when a party is entitled 
to attorney fees by contract, the fees requested must be 
reasonable. Hoth v. White, 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah App. 1990). 
It is impossible for a court to determine whether attorney 
fees are reasonable unless supporting evidence accompanies the 
request. In Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 
(Utah App. 1990), cert. den. 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990), a party 
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sought attorney fees solely on the basis of a contractual provi-
sion without offering evidence that the particular amount sought 
was justified. The provision was less restrictive than the one 
in this case, stipulating for the reimbursement of attorney fees 
arising from all claims made by the other party. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of fees, explaining 
that 
[i]t is well established that to justify a finding of a 
reasonable attorney's fee, there must be evidence in support 
of that finding.... It is beyond dispute that an eviden-
tiary basis is a fundamental requirement for establishing an 
award of attorney fees. 
Ringwood, 786 P.2d at 1361 (citations omitted). 
Rule 4-505 of the Code of Judicial Administration details 
the format for presenting this evidentiary basis. It requires 
that an affidavit accompany a request for attorney fees which 
set [s] forth specifically the legal basis for the award, the 
nature of the work performed by the attorney, the number of 
hours spent to prosecute the claim to judgment, ... and 
affirm[s] the reasonableness of the fees for comparable 
legal services. 
Rule 4-505(1), Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
Water Power never submitted such an affidavit, much less 
attempted to document the reasonableness of the fees in any other 
form. 
The presence of a contractual provision for attorney fees 
does not automatically entitle a party to whatever amount it 
demands. Once it establishes that the contractual terms have 
been satisfied, it must then provide evidentiary support for the 
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amount requested in compliance with Rule 4-505. Unless a party 
does this, its request for fees simply cannot be entertained. 
2. WATER POWER'S DILATORY ACTIONS INDICATE THAT ITS 
REQUEST IS UNREASONABLE. 
After a party submits a Rule 4-505 affidavit, the trial 
court may consider other factors to determine the reasonableness 
of the fee requested. Included among these factors is the 
efficiency of the party in bringing and terminating the case. 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988-90 (Utah 1988). 
The record demonstrates Water Power's lack of efficiency. 
It initially agreed to share attorney fees by presenting a joint 
appeal to the Tax Commission. However, it later elected to pay 
attorneys to pursue its own appeal. Water Power's appeal ended 
two years after Strawberry's appeal, presented the same issues 
for consideration, and achieved the same result. 
Water Power also resisted Strawberry's efforts to terminate 
the civil action. Only months after Water Power filed its 
Complaint, Strawberry offered it enough money to satisfy the Tax 
Commission's warrant. In fact, Strawberry offered Water Power 
over $12,000 more than the state accepted as full satisfaction 
several years later. Water Power failed to respond to this 
offer, instead choosing to continue litigation until the court 
terminated it more than three years later in Strawberry's favor. 
Water Power refused an offer to settle the case which resulted in 
more litigation and this appeal. When a party declines such 
gratuitous settlement offers, the court may appropriately deny 
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attorney fees even if authorized by contract. Cable Marine, Inc. 
v. M/V Trust Me II, 632 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1980), cited with 
approval in Cobabe v. Crawford, 780 P.2d 834, 836 n.3 (Utah App. 
19 89) (Cable Marine attached as Addendum C). 
At many points during the civil and administrative 
proceedings, Strawberry gave Water Power opportunities to curtail 
attorney fees. Having refused each opportunity, Water Power must 
absorb its self-generated expenses. 
C. Water Power Has Not Preserved This Issue Below And Is 
Therefore Barred From Presenting It On Appeal. 
Water Power vaguely introduced its request for attorney fees 
to the court below by stating that fees were provided for in the 
contract. It never cited the alleged provision nor attempted to 
explain how the provision was applicable. With nothing more 
before it than a bare assertion that the contract allowed 
attorney fees, the trial court properly rejected Water Power's 
request. This Court has previously stressed that "[t]he mere 
mention of an issue...when no supporting evidence or relevant 
legal authority is introduced...is insufficient to raise an issue 
at trial and thus insufficient to preserve the issue for appeal." 
LeBaron & Assoc, v. Rebel Enterprises, 823 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah 
App. 1991). Because Water Power does not comply with Utah Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(5)(A), it is impossible to tell 
where, if anywhere, it believes it preserved this issue with 
sufficient specificity. Water Power's obscure reference below to 
"the contract" is insufficient to allow it on appeal finally to 
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cite the contractual provision and present a full-fledged legal 
argument. 
POINT II 
WATER POWER CANNOT RECEIVE 
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE THIRD PARTY TORT RULE. 
This Court should reject Water Power's contention that 
Strawberry must pay attorney fees incurred in the Tax Commission 
appeal because Strawberry "forced" it to appeal.3 (Appellant's 
Brief at 9). The third party tort rule is inapplicable to this 
case. 
A. The Facts And Context Of This Case Make The Third Party 
Tort Rule Inapplicable. 
The third-party tort rule allows a party to recover 
reasonable attorney fees incurred in pursuing litigation with a 
third party that are a natural consequence of one's negligence. 
Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur.. 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993). This 
rule cannot apply to the present situation, primarily because 
Strawberry has not committed a negligent or otherwise tortious 
act. Although Water Power claims for the first time on appeal 
that it became liable for the tax due to Strawberry's 
"negligent, or intentional" nonpayment, Water Power has never 
before suggested that Strawberry acted tortiously. (Appellant's 
Brief at 9). Nothing prevented Water Power from including a 
cause of action for negligence or intentional tort in its 
3Water Power's claim is curious given the fact that at the 
time the assessments were made both Strawberry and Water Power 
believed the assessments were invalid and determined to appeal 
the assessments. 
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Complaint, but Water Power chose to limit its allegations against 
Strawberry to breach of contract, At any rate, Water Power cites 
no support in the record to establish that Strawberry committed 
tortious conduct. 
The third-party tort rule also does not apply to this case 
because Water Power has not shown that it incurred attorney fees 
in the administrative proceeding as a natural consequence of 
Strawberry's actions. To the contrary, Water Power chose to 
initiate its own appeal entirely of its own volition. Had it not 
reneged on the agreement to pursue a joint appeal, it would never 
have incurred the "consequential damages" it is now claiming. 
B. Water Power Did Not Preserve This Issue For Appeal. 
As with its contractual basis for attorney fees, Water Power 
did not preserve the third party tort rule issue below. There is 
absolutely no mention in the record of this rule as a means of 
awarding attorney fees. Because Water Power did not present this 
argument to the court below, this Court should disregard it. See 
Palmer v. Hayes, 892 P.2d 1059 (Utah App. 1995) (claim for 
attorney fees under statute raised for first time on appeal 
cannot be considered). 
Water Power cannot rely on the newly-raised third party tort 
rule as a means of receiving attorney fees incurred in the Tax 
Commission appeal. The rule was never meant to stretch to every 
situation where a party claims it incurred legal fees due to 
another party's actions. 
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POINT III 
WATER POWER CANNOT RECEIVE 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR THIS APPEAL. 
A party may only be awarded attorney fees for appeal if 
received attorney fees below and prevails on appeal. Wade v. 
Stangl. 869 P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1994). Because the lower court 
properly denied Water Power's claim for attorney fees, Water 
Power is not entitled to attorney fees expended on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Water Power has failed to demonstrate that the lower court 
abused its discretion in denying attorney fees. It asks this 
Court for an award of attorney fees based upon arguments that 
were not presented to the lower court. Even so, the contract 
provision and third party tort rule arguments are meritless. 
Finally, Water Power has made no attempt to show that the fees 
demands are reasonable. Strawberry requests that this Court 
affirm the lower court's denial of attorney fees. 
DATED this /D^K day of August, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By_ -, r. -J^m^^fj 
Rjeed L. Martineau 
cyan E. Tibbitts 
Julianne P. Blanch 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A: 
Ruling on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
Order on Summary Judgment 
REED L. MARTINEAU (A2106) 
R Y A N E . TIBBITTS (A4423) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant 
10 Exchange P lace , Eleventh Floor 
Pos t Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake Ci ty , Utah 84145 
Te lephone : (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH 
WATER POWER COMPANY, a Utah 
co rpo ra t ion , 
ORDER ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STRAWBERRY WATER USERS Case No. 900400932CV 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah co rpo ra t i on , J u d g e Lynn Davis 
Defendan t . 
This ma t t e r hav ing come before t h e Cour t on Defendan t ' s Motion for 
Summary J u d g m e n t , bo th p a r t i e s h a v i n g submi t ted memoranda in s u p p o r t of t he i r 
r e s p e c t i v e p o s i t i o n s , and t h e m a t t e r h a v i n g now been submit ted for dec is ion , t he 
C o u r t , a f te r careful ly c o n s i d e r i n g t h e memoranda submi t ted b y counse l , h e r e b y 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES: 
1. The fac ts as se t f o r t h in D e f e n d a n t s init ial memoranda w e r e not 
d i s p u t e d by Plaintiff a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e C o u r t adop t s t hose facts and a c c e p t s 
them as t r u e ; 
2» Based upon t h e u n i q u e fac ts and c i rcumstances s u r r o u n d i n g th i s 
m a t t e r , t h e C o u r t is not incl ined to award Plaintiff a t t o r n e y ' s f ees ; 
7! ' A [ rACj 
r- **-\fi 
290 
3. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and 
judgment is awarded in favor of Defendant, no cause of action, on all claims 
asserted by Plaintiff. Each pa r ty to bear their own costs and fees. 
DATED /£ C/7Hr/^ / ^ ^ ^ . 
B Y T H E C O U R T : 
^/Qfe'l'TA 
YNN DAVIS/ 
District Court Judge 
** '1 
UTAH ^ 
- 2 -
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Cynthia Northstrom, being duly sworn, says that she is employed by the law 
offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, at torneys for Defendant herein; that 
she served the attached Order on Summary Judgment (Case Number 900400932CV, 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County, State of Utah) upon the parties listed 
below by placing a t rue and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Charles C. Brown, Esq. 
Budge W. Call, Esq, 
Brown & Brown 
505 East 200 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and causing the same to be mailed first class, postage prepaid, on the ^l^-f^day 
of December, 1994. 
ynthia Northitrom 
me this ^ A ^ * d a y of December, 1994. SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in the State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
LYNETTE FARMER 
10 Exchange Placa #1100 
Sait Late City. Utah 84101 
tty Comtnlsston Expim 
August 24,1W6 
STATE OF UTAH 
FiLED 
Fourth Juocai P-F.r'ot Court 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT GOUjRT- Count, ~ > - at .JU>.» 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAlCARVsAB. $MsT h . C !<;•"• 
WATER POWER COMPANY, a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STRAWBERRY WATER USERS 
ASSOCIATION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 900400932 
DATE: December 15, 1994 
JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Defendant, represented by Ryan E. Tibbitts, filed memoranda in support of its motion, and 
Plaintiff, represented by Charles C. Brown, filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. 
The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda submitted by counsel, now enters the 
following: 
RULING 
The facts as set forth in Defendant's initial memoranda were not disputed, and 
therefore, the Court adopts those facts and accepts them as true. Based upon the unique facts 
and circumstances surrounding this matter, the Court is not inclined to award Plaintiffs 
attorney fees. Therefore, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted, and 
the case is closed. Counsel for Defendant is instructed to prepare an order consistent with 
this ruling. 
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Dated at Provo, Utah, this /0_ day of 4J+C- , 1994. 
BY THE COURT 
cc: Ryan E. Tibbitts, Esq. 
Charles C. Brovm, Esq. 
. / 
Lynn W. Davis 
^ 
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ADDENDUM B: 
Contract 
ZMut* 
AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT, made and executed as of the 24th day of January, 
1933 by and between STRAWBERRY WATER USERS ASSOCIATION, a 
Utah Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Buyer" and WATER POWER 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, hereinafter referred to as "Company*1. 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, the Buyer desires to build a new 3500 kw hydropower facility 
near the existing Upper Spanish Fork Hydro Plant, (herein after referred 
to as "Project"), and 
WHEREAS, the Buyer desires to engage the services of the Company on 
the Project and the Company desires to perform such services, pursuant 
to the terms and conditions of this Agreement as herein set forth. 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants 
herein contained and the monetary consideration herein recited, it is 
mutally agreed by and between the parties as follows: 
1. WORK TO BE PERFORMED BY THE COMPANY. The Buyer 
hereby engages the Company, and the Company does herejby agree to 
perform the following: 
A. General: The Company will design, fabricate, install and 
start up penstock and turbine generator units to the following 
specifications: 
Two Turbines: (each) 
Power - 2450 hp 
Speed - 600 rpm 
Head Effective - 125 ft 
Flow - 200 cfs 
Generator: Power - 1750 kw 
Speed - 600 rpm 
Voltage - 2300 volts 
Temp. Rating - 6C°C continuous 
Penstock: Size - 2-60 inch diameter 
Length - 340 feet each 
Existing Wasteway: Repair the overflow crest of existing 
wasteway 
B. Specific: The Company shall proceed diligently to perform 
the following in a good and workmanlike manner for the fee as 
provided for herein: 
TURBINE: 
Design and manufacture two Francis turbines to the 
specifications of Paragraph 1A. The turbine runner, 
wicket gates and gate shafts will be stainless steel as 
per HydroWest Group standard specs. Spiral case 
and all other related parts will be cast or fabricated 
steel. 
GENERATOR: 
The generator will be designed and manufactured to 
HydroWest Group specifications as per the 
nameplate data listed in Paragraph 1A. The 
insulation system will be Class FFFX and the stator 
will have a minimum of 6 RTD's to indicate winding 
temperature. The generator field will have adequate 
WR^ (built in inertia) to permit stable operation for 
remote and manual synchronization. The entire 
rotation assembly will have total runaway speed 
capability. 
EXCITER: 
The exciter will be static or brushless and will have 
solid state voltage regulation. 
SWITCHGEAR: 
The switchgear and relay protection will be standard 
utility grade designed for HydroWest Group for local 
manual and remote operation, including the lower 400 
kw Spanish Fork Hydro Plant. 
SUPERVISORY CONTROL: 
The supervisory control will be designed by 
HydroWest Group and manufactured by Digitek 
Corporation to remotely control the two main 
turbines plus the recently uprated lower 400 kw 
Spanish Fork Hydro Plant turbine. 
STEP-UP TRANSFORMER: 
A step-up transformer, low voltage connection box, 
high voltage disconnect with, fuses and lightning 
arrestors will be furnished with the following 
capabilities: 
1. 5900 KYA minimum with provision for 25% 
additional capcity from F.O.A. 
2. Voltage - 2.3 KV step up to 46 KY with 5 no load 
taps of 5% each 
ASSEMBLY & INSTALLATION: 
Will be by contractor working for Water Power 
Company under the direction of HydroWest Group, 
Inc. 
PENSTOCK: 
60" x 5/16" steel with coal tar enamel inner coating 
and coal tar outer coating with poly-ken protective 
wrap. Sacrificial anode electrolysis protection 
INTAKE: 
Two with screens and motorized 6' x 6' vertical slide 
gates at entrance to each penstock 
MEASURING DEVICE: 
Mapco Sonic Measuring Device to be installed in 60" 
penstock to measure instantaneous and totalized flow 
to each turbine 
POWERHOUSE: 
Insulated metal building 30' x 301 with 
thermostatically controlled louvers 
Two motorized butterfly valves 60" diameter ahead 
of turbine 
Two motorized slide (sluice) gates 4f x V for Salem 
Canal 
Reinforcer concrete box culvert between powerhouse 
and Salem Canal 
C. Technical Director: The Company shall furnish a technical 
representative qualified to install and erect the equipment to be 
furnished hereunder, together with all other onsite or offsite 
labor required for the performance of this agreement. 
2. PAYMENT BY OWNER TO THE COMPANY: The Buyer hereby 
agrees to pay to the Company for the work to be performed, a sum of 
$2,788,000 payable in monthly installments as specified in the 
attached Exhibit "A", "Construction Control and Payment Schedule11. 
He's agreed that failure to meet the payment schedule will delay 
extend the compeltion date. 
3. INFORMATION TO BE PROVIDED BY THE BUYER: The Buyer 
agrees to provide the Company with complete information concerning 
the project and to provide access for the Company to enter the 
premises as required to perform the work. The Buyer shall designate 
one individual to act as the Buyers representative with respect to the 
work to be performed by the Company under this Agreement. The 
person designated as the Buyers representative shall have complete 
authority to transmit instructions, receive information, interpret and 
define the Buyers policy and decisions and approve payments under 
the "Construction Contract and Payment Schedule'1 with respect to 
work covered by this Agreement. 
INSURANCE AND INDEMNIFICATION: The Company shall 
secure and maintain such insurance as will protect the Company from 
claims under Workmen's Compensation acts and from all other claims 
for bodily injury, death or property damage which may arise out of the 
performance of or failure to perform services by the Company under 
this Agreement and the Company does hereby indemnify and hold 
harmless the Buyer from any and all such liability, claims or 
obligations. The Company will provide a one-year warranty from the 
date of completion for all equipment, and a performance and payment 
bond for the project. 
5. CHANGES AND MODIFICATIONS: This Agreement shall be 
modified only by a written agreement setting forth the terms and 
conditions of such changes and modifications and the same being 
executed by each of the parties hereto. 
6. COMPLETION: Ail work shall be completed on or before 
September 30, 1983 as shown on the attached "Construction Control 
and Payment Schedule", identified as Exhibit "A". 
7. ADDITIONAL TERMS: The terms and provisions of "Conditions of 
Sale", attached hereto as Exhibit "B", are hereby agreed to and 
incorporated herein. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have set their hands the day 
and year f'rrst set forth above. 
BUYER COMPANY 
TITLE: \ ^ ^ ^ A ^ TITLE: CrAn/sv^? *? c ^ ^ ^ ^ 
WITNESS: y^^^^^^^yfTNESS: M,*£,£*£,. 
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Cable Marine, Inc. v . M/V Trust Me II, 632 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1980) 
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instruction of which Sarris complains in 
anyway expressed a view concerning the 
credibility of any statement made by the 
informant but rather only informed the 
jury as to the practical role of informants in 
cases of this type.2 Finally, it is clear that 
the trial court did give an adequate general 
instruction as to the assessment of the cred-
ibility of witnesses.3 
AFFIRMED. 
CABLE MARINE, INC., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
M/V TRUST ME II, M. Whiting, Ronald 
Gurvin and Small Boat Rentals, Inc., 
Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 80-5181 
Summary Calendar. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Unit 13 
Dec. 19, 1980. 
Plaintiff appealed from a decision of 
the United States District Court for the 
2. This Court has stated that it is the nature of 
certain crimes, including gambling, to often be 
undetectable absent the use of government in-
formants. See, United States v. Timberlake, 
559 F.2d 1375, 1378. n.7 (5th Cir. 1977). 
3. The following is an excerpt from the trial 
court's instruction to the jury. 
Now, you must consider all of the evidence, 
but this does not mean that you must accept 
all of the evidence as being true or accurate. 
You are the sole judges. You and you alone 
are the judges of the credibility, or the believ-
ability, il the will, of each witness, as well as 
the weight to be given his testimony. 
Southern District of Florida, Norman C. 
Roettger, Jr., J., denying it attorney fees 
incurred in its successful suit on maritime 
lien. The Court of Appeals held that the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying an award of attorney fees to plain-
tiff, even though attorney fees were autho-
rized by contract, where plaintiff had de-
clined defendant's generous settlement of-
fers made several months before trial. 
Affirmed. 
1. Federal Civil Procedure «=> 2737.5 
Where attorney fees are provided by 
contract, a trial court does not possess the 
same degree of equitable discretion to deny 
such fees that it has when applying statute 
allowing for discretionary award; however, 
a court, in its sound discretion may decline 
to award attorney fees authorized by a con-
tractual provision when it believes that 
such an award would be inequitable and 
unreasonable. 
2. Federal Civil Procedure <$=*2737.5 
District court did not abuse its discre-
tion in denying prevailing plaintiff attorney 
fees, even though such fees were authorized 
by contract, where plaintiff declined de-
fendant's generous settlement offers made 
several months before trial. 
Weaver & Weaver, Thomas D. Lardin, 
Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiff-appel-
lant. 
In weighing the testimony of a witness, you 
should consider his relationship to the 
government, or to any defendant. You 
should consider his interest, if any, in the 
outcome of this case. You should consider 
his manner of testifying, his opportunity to 
observe or acquire the knowledge that he 
testified about. You should consider his can-
dor, openness, fairness and intelligence, and 
you should also consider the extent to which 
he has been supported, or contradicted by 
other creditable evidence. 
In short, you may accept or reject the testi-
mony of any witness who appeared in this 
courtroom, either in whole or in part. 
CABLE MARINE, INC. v. M/V TRUST ME II 
Cite as 632 F.2d 1344 (1980) 
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Ronald Payne, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for 
defendants-appellees. 
Appeal from the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida. 
Before RONEY, FRANK M. JOHNSON, 
Jr. and HENDERSON, Circuit Judges. 
PER CURIAM: 
Plaintiff appeals from the denial of attor-
ney's fees incurred in its successful suit on a 
maritime lien. Holding the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying at-
torney's fees, we affirm. 
Plaintiff filed suit on October 20, 1978, to 
recover for repairs it performed on a forty-
one foot vessel owned by defendant. Plain-
tiff claimed $3,960 as the amount owed, 
plus costs and attorney's fees. Defendant, 
contending that it was overcharged for the 
repairs, had sent a check for $2,500 to plain-
tiff prior to the filing of suit, but plaintiff 
refused to accept this payment. 
The parties engaged in settlement negoti-
ations between the time the suit was filed 
and the time of trial. In March, 1979, de-
fendant offered to settle the action in its 
entirety for $3,750. This offer was refused. 
At least six months prior to trial, defendant 
raised its settlement offer to $4,200, but 
this offer was also declined. 
The bench trial took place on December 
26 and 27, 1979. Finding that some over-
charges did in fact exist, the court awarded 
plaintiff $3,460, plus interest and court 
costs. After a brief hearing, the court 
ruled that each party should bear its own 
attorney's fees. Plaintiff appeals from this 
ruling. 
Attorney's fees generally may be award-
ed only when authorized by statute or con-
tract. See, e. g., Kessler v. Pennsylvania 
National Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 
531 F.2d 248, 255 (5th Cir. 1976); Aerosonic 
Corp. v. Trodync Corp., 402 F.2d 223, 228 
(5th Cir. 1968). Attorney's fees are autho-
rized in this case by the work order for the 
repairs, which provides for the allowance of 
reasonable fees to plaintiff in the event it is 
compelled to initiate collection proceedings. 
The district court, however, held that it 
would be unreasonable to assess attorney's 
fees against defendant. Although its rea-
sons were not clearly articulated, the court 
apparently believed that plaintiff had acted 
unreasonably in not accepting either of the 
earlier settlement offers made by defend-
ant and in forcing the cause to trial. 
[1] Where attorney's fees are provided 
by contract, a trial court does not possess 
the same degree of equitable discretion to 
deny such fees that it has when applying a 
statute allowing for a discretionary award. 
Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 226 
(5th Cir. 1975). Nevertheless, a court in its 
sound discretion may decline to award at-
torney's fees authorized by a contractual 
provision when it believes that such an 
award would be inequitable and unreason-
able. See, e. g., United States v. Mountain 
States Construction Co., 588 F.2d 259, 263 
(9th Cir. 1978); Manchester Gardens v. 
Great West Life Assurance Co., 205 F.2d 
872, 878 & n.14 (D.C.Cir.1953); Schmidt v. 
Interstate Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n., 
421 F.Supp. 1016, 1019 (D.D.C.1976); Con-
sumers Time Credit, Inc. v. Remark Corp., 
259 F.Supp. 135, 137 (E.D.Pa.1966). In 
Manchester Gardens, for example, the court 
held that attorney's fees may be withheld if 
the claim was pursued unnecessarily. 
[2] In this case, defendant had made 
generous settlement offers several months 
before trial. In fact, the second offer of 
$4,200 was only slightly less than the total 
of the full amount claimed by plaintiff as 
the cost of repairs, excluding the charges 
conceded by plaintiff at trial to be unjusti-
fied, and the amount claimed by plaintiff's 
attorney for his fees up to the date of trial. 
Although the plaintiff may have been 
compelled to initiate a lawsuit to recover 
the repair costs, the district court could well 
have concluded that plaintiff acted unrea-
sonably in incurring needless expense by 
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pursuing the suit beyond the offers of pay-
ment. We cannot hold that the court 
abused its discretion in denying an award of 
attorney's fees to plaintiff. 
AFFIRMED. 
Edgar J. BOUDLOCHE, Petitioner, 
v. 
HOWARD TRUCKING CO., INC., North-
west Insurance Co. and Director, Office 
of Workers' Compensation Programs, U. 
S. Department of Labor, Respondents. 
No. 80-3045. 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit. 
Unit A 
Dec. 19, 1980. 
age on the ground that his maritime em-
ployment was insubstantial. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Workers' Compensation <3=>262 
Worker who was directed to regularly 
perform some portion of what was indisput-
ably longshoring work at fully equipped 
docks and, for at least some part of his 
work was required to perform total mari-
time job at unequipped docks was within 
coverage of Longshoremen's and Harbor 
Workers' Compensation Act though his em-
ployer also assigned him broader duties as 
truck driver, and he was not beyond cover-
age on the ground that his maritime em-
ployment was insubstantial. Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation 
Act, §§ 1 et seq., 2(3, 4), 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901 
et seq., 902(3, 4). 
Weigand & Siegrist, Christopher B. Sieg-
rist, Houma, La., for petitioner. 
Carin A. Clauss, Sol. of Labor, Mark C. 
Walters, Gilbert T. Renaut, U. S. Dept. of 
Labor, Washington, D. C, Roger J. Larue, 
Jr., Metairie, La., for respondents. 
Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Benefits Review Board. 
The Benefits Review Board found that 
worker had not been within the coverage of 
the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act because his maritime 
employment was insubstantial. On petition 
for review the Court of Appeals, Charles 
Clark, Circuit Judge, held that worker who 
was directed to regularly perform some por-
tion of what was indisputably longshoring 
work at fully equipped docks and, for at 
least some part of his work was required to 
perform total maritime job at unequipped 
locks was within coverage though his em-
ployer also assigned him broader duties as 
truck driver, and he was not beyond cover-
Before COLEMAN, Chief Judge, 
CHARLES CLARK and REAVLEY, Cir-
cuit Judges. 
CHARLES CLARK, Circuit Judge: 
A majority of the Benefits Review Board 
asserts that Congress did not intend for the 
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers* Com-
pensation Act (Act) to cover employees 
whose maritime employment was insub-
stantial. Because the Supreme Court has 
held Congress intended to cover workers 
when at least some part of their duties 
involved such employment, we reverse and 
remand. 
BOUDLOCHE v. HOWARD TRUCKING CO., INC. 
Cite as 632 F.2d 1346 (1980) 
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The facts as found by the Board are as 
follows. The claimant, Edgar J. Boudloche, 
was employed by Howard Trucking Compa-
ny, Inc., (Howard) as a truck driver. How-
ard was engaged in the business of trans-
porting oil field and marine equipment used 
in drilling for oil and gas offshore and on 
land. Boudloche hauled heavy oil field 
equipment on a large truck and a flatbed 
trailer rig. Approximately half of his runs 
were from one land based site to another. 
The other half required him to either pick 
up or deliver equipment at a dock. Ten to 
twenty percent of the docks worked by 
Boudloche had no loading or unloading 
equipment or personnel. At such docks 
Boudloche did all of the work of loading 
and unloading the equipment by himself. 
The remaining docks where Boudloche 
picked up or delivered equipment were 
equipped with cranes and laborers called 
"roustabouts" to load and unload. To de-
velop good will for his employer, Boudloche 
was expected to assist in the loading and 
unloading process even at those well 
equipped facilities. Boudloche estimated 
that he had a delivery or a pick-up two or 
three times a week at a poorly equipped 
dock where he had to do the loading or 
unloading himself. 
Boudloche would use either a winch or a 
gin pole on his truck to load or unload at 
unequipped docks. This required that he 
board the barge being loaded or unloaded to 
secure or release cables on the cargo. Only 
2xk to 5 percent of his overall work time 
was spent loading or unloading cargo at 
unequipped dock facilities where he had to 
board vessels. 
On the day of his injury, Boudloche was 
assigned to pick up several small boats used 
in oil and gas drilling operations. These 
boats were to be picked up at an une-
quipped dock facility. When he arrived at 
the dock with his truck, the boats were tied 
up at the water's ei\gc. The dock was no 
more than a gravel and shell-covered slope 
leading down into the water. Boudloche 
backed his trailer to the water's edge and 
ran his winch line from the back of his cab 
along the trailer bed and tied it to the front 
of the first boat. He then winched the boat 
out of the water and onto his trailer. He 
loaded two boats in this manner. When he 
attempted to load the third boat, which was 
made of steel and much heavier than the 
first two, the boat slipped and fell on the 
claimant. Boudloche sustained a crushed 
pelvis and urological injuries. 
Since Boudloche was at a dock at the 
water's edge when he was injured, he was 
within the Act's waterfront situs provision. 
33 U.S.C. § 902(4). The single issue is 
whether a claimant who regularly performs 
indisputably maritime operations, but which 
maritime operations constitute only a small 
portion of his overall working time, occu-
pies a status covered by the Act. 
Section 2(3) of the Act provides: 
The term "employee" means any per-
son engaged in maritime employment, in-
cluding any longshoreman or other person 
engaged in longshoring operations, and 
any harborworker including a ship repair-
man, shipbuilder, and shipbreaker, . . . . 
33 U.S.C. § 902(3). The Board determined 
that the Act required a substantial portion 
of an employee's duties be in longshoring 
operations to be covered. They concluded 
that because Boudloche spent only 2'/2 to 5 
percent of his overall working time per-
forming the full maritime function of a 
longshoreman, he did not meet their "sub-
stantial portion" of duties requirement. 
In Northeast Marine Terminal Co., Inc. v. 
Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 
L.Ed.2d 320 (1977), the Supreme Court held 
the Act's status requirement was met by a 
terminal laborer who sometimes worked at 
shore-based jobs and at other times per-
formed a longshoreman's function. They 
defined longshoremen as "persons whose 
employment is such that they spend at least 
some of their time in indisputably longshor-
ing operations %y(4)" 432 U.S. at 273, 97 
S.Ct. at 2362. Two years later, in P. C. 
Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. Ford, 444 U.S. 69, 100 
S.Ct. 328, 62 L.Ed.2d 225, the Court held 
